Slavoj Žižek Publishes a Very Clearly Written Essay-Length Response to Chomsky’s “Brutal” Criticisms

zizek sitting

Fur has flown, claws and teeth were bared, and fold­ing chairs were thrown! But of course I refer to the bristly exchange between those two stars of the aca­d­e­m­ic left, Slavoj Žižek and Noam Chom­sky. And yes, I’m pok­ing fun at the way we—and the blo­gos­phere du jour—have turned their shots at one anoth­er into some kind of celebri­ty slap­fight or epic rap bat­tle grudge match. We aim to enter­tain as well as inform, it’s true, and it’s hard to take any of this too seri­ous­ly, since par­ti­sans of either thinker will tend to walk away with their pre­vi­ous assump­tions con­firmed once every­one goes back to their cor­ners.

But despite the seem­ing cat­ti­ness of Chom­sky and Žižek’s high­ly medi­at­ed exchanges (per­haps we’re drum­ming it up because a sim­ple face-to-face debate has yet to occur, and prob­a­bly won’t), there is a great deal of sub­stance to their vol­leys and ripostes, as they butt up against crit­i­cal ques­tions about what phi­los­o­phy is and what role it can and should play in polit­i­cal strug­gle. As to the for­mer, must all phi­los­o­phy emu­late the sci­ences? Must it be empir­i­cal and con­sis­tent­ly make trans­par­ent truth claims? Might not “the­o­ry,” for exam­ple (a word Chom­sky dis­miss­es in this con­text), use the forms of literature—elaborate metaphor, play­ful sys­tems of ref­er­ence, sym­bol­ism and anal­o­gy? Or make use of psy­cho­an­a­lyt­ic and Marx­i­an ter­mi­nol­o­gy in evoca­tive and nov­el ways in seri­ous attempts to engage with ide­o­log­i­cal for­ma­tions that do not reveal them­selves in sim­ple terms?

Anoth­er issue raised by Chomsky’s cri­tiques: should the work of philoso­phers who iden­ti­fy with the polit­i­cal left endeav­or for a clar­i­ty of expres­sion and a direct util­i­ty for those who labor under sys­tems of oppres­sion, lest obscu­ran­tist and jar­gon-laden writ­ing become itself an oppres­sive tool and self-ref­er­en­tial game played for elit­ist intel­lec­tu­als? These are all impor­tant ques­tions that nei­ther Žižek nor Chom­sky has yet tak­en on direct­ly, but that both have oblique­ly addressed in testy off-the-cuff ver­bal inter­views, and that might be pur­sued by more dis­in­ter­est­ed par­ties who could use their exchange as an exem­plar of a cur­rent method­olog­i­cal rift that needs to be more ful­ly explored, if nev­er, per­haps, ful­ly resolved. As Žižek makes quite clear in his most recent—and very clearly-written—essay-length reply to Chomsky’s lat­est com­ment on his work (pub­lished in full on the Ver­so Books blog), this is a very old con­flict.

Žižek spends the bulk of his reply exon­er­at­ing him­self of the charges Chom­sky levies against him, and find­ing much com­mon ground with Chom­sky along the way, while ulti­mate­ly defend­ing his so-called con­ti­nen­tal approach. He pro­vides ample cita­tions of his own work and oth­ers to sup­port his claims, and he is detailed and spe­cif­ic in his his­tor­i­cal analy­sis. Žižek is skep­ti­cal of Chomsky’s claims to stand up for “vic­tims of Third World suf­fer­ing,” and he makes it plain where the two dis­agree, not­ing, how­ev­er, that their antag­o­nism is most­ly a ter­ri­to­r­i­al dis­pute over ques­tions of style (with Chom­sky as a slight­ly morose guardian of seri­ous, sci­en­tif­ic thought and Žižek as a some­times buf­foon­ish prac­ti­tion­er of a much more lit­er­ary tra­di­tion). He ends with a dig that is sure to keep fan­ning the flames:

To avoid a mis­un­der­stand­ing, I am not advo­cat­ing here the “post­mod­ern” idea that our the­o­ries are just sto­ries we are telling each oth­er, sto­ries which can­not be ground­ed in facts; I am also not advo­cat­ing a pure­ly neu­tral unbi­ased view. My point is that the plu­ral­i­ty of sto­ries and bias­es is itself ground­ed in our real strug­gles. With regard to Chom­sky, I claim that his bias some­times leads him to selec­tions of facts and con­clu­sions which obfus­cate the com­plex real­i­ty he is try­ing to ana­lyze.

………………….

Con­se­quent­ly, what today, in the pre­dom­i­nant West­ern pub­lic speech, the “Human Rights of the Third World suf­fer­ing vic­tims” effec­tive­ly mean is the right of the West­ern pow­ers them­selves to intervene—politically, eco­nom­i­cal­ly, cul­tur­al­ly, militarily—in the Third World coun­tries of their choice on behalf of the defense of Human Rights. My dis­agree­ment with Chomsky’s polit­i­cal analy­ses lies else­where: his neglect of how ide­ol­o­gy works, as well as the prob­lem­at­ic nature of his biased deal­ing with facts which often leads him to do what he accus­es his oppo­nents of doing.

But I think that the dif­fer­ences in our polit­i­cal posi­tions are so min­i­mal that they can­not real­ly account for the thor­ough­ly dis­mis­sive tone of Chomsky’s attack on me. Our con­flict is real­ly about some­thing else—it is sim­ply a new chap­ter in the end­less gigan­tomachy between so-called con­ti­nen­tal phi­los­o­phy and the Anglo-Sax­on empiri­cist tra­di­tion. There is noth­ing spe­cif­ic in Chomsky’s critique—the same accu­sa­tions of irra­tional­i­ty, of emp­ty pos­tur­ing, of play­ing with fan­cy words, were heard hun­dreds of times against Hegel, against Hei­deg­ger, against Der­ri­da, etc. What stands out is only the blind bru­tal­i­ty of his dis­missal

I think one can con­vinc­ing­ly show that the con­ti­nen­tal tra­di­tion in phi­los­o­phy, although often dif­fi­cult to decode, and sometimes—I am the first to admit this—defiled by fan­cy jar­gon, remains in its core a mode of think­ing which has its own ratio­nal­i­ty, inclu­sive of respect for empir­i­cal data. And I fur­ther­more think that, in order to grasp the dif­fi­cult predica­ment we are in today, to get an ade­quate cog­ni­tive map­ping of our sit­u­a­tion, one should not shirk the resorts of the con­ti­nen­tal tra­di­tion in all its guis­es, from the Hegelian dialec­tics to the French “decon­struc­tion.” Chom­sky obvi­ous­ly doesn’t agree with me here. So what if—just anoth­er fan­cy idea of mine—what if Chom­sky can­not find any­thing in my work that goes “beyond the lev­el of some­thing you can explain in five min­utes to a twelve-year-old” because, when he deals with con­ti­nen­tal thought, it is his mind which func­tions as the mind of a twelve-year-old, the mind which is unable to dis­tin­guish seri­ous philo­soph­i­cal reflec­tion from emp­ty pos­tur­ing and play­ing with emp­ty words?

Relat­ed Con­tent:

Noam Chom­sky Slams Žižek and Lacan: Emp­ty ‘Pos­tur­ing’

Slavoj Žižek Responds to Noam Chom­sky: ‘I Don’t Know a Guy Who Was So Often Empir­i­cal­ly Wrong’

The Feud Con­tin­ues: Noam Chom­sky Responds to Žižek, Describes Remarks as ‘Sheer Fan­ta­sy’

Josh Jones is a writer and musi­cian based in Wash­ing­ton, DC. Fol­low him at @jdmagness

The History of Philosophy, from 600 B.C.E. to 1935, Visualized in Two Massive, 44-Foot High Diagrams


The his­to­ry of phi­los­o­phy tends to get might­i­ly abbre­vi­at­ed. The few phi­los­o­phy pro­fes­sors I know don’t have much truck with gen­er­al­ist “his­to­ry of ideas”-type projects, and the dis­ci­pline itself encour­ages, nay, requires, inten­sive spe­cial­iza­tion. Add to this glib com­ments like Alfred North Whitehead’s on phi­los­o­phy as a “series of foot­notes to Pla­to,” and the emi­nent posi­tion of the errat­ic and com­par­a­tive­ly philo­soph­i­cal­ly-unschooled auto­di­dact Wittgen­stein, and you have, in mod­ern phi­los­o­phy, a sad neglect of the geneal­o­gy of thought.

But take heart, you who, like me, incline toward minor fig­ures and obscure rela­tion­ships. Ohio State pro­fes­sor of phi­los­o­phy Kevin Scharp is a Lin­naean tax­on­o­mist of thought, com­pil­ing charts, “Infor­ma­tion Box­es,” and hand-drawn dia­grams of the “Soci­ol­o­gy of Phi­los­o­phy,” like that above, which cov­ers West­ern phi­los­o­phy from 600 B.C.E. to 600 C.E. and shows the myr­i­ad com­plex con­nec­tions between hun­dreds of indi­vid­ual philoso­phers and schools of thought (such as Sto­icism, Skep­ti­cism, Neo-Pla­ton­ism, etc.). The sec­ond mas­sive dia­gram cov­ers 600 C.E. to about 1935. Each one is about 4 feet wide and 44 feet tall, with the text at 12-pont font. Both dia­grams are based on Soci­ol­o­gy of Philoso­phies by Ran­dall Collins.

Note: to see the dia­grams in detail, you will need to click the links above, and then click again on the images that appear on the new web page.

Relat­ed Con­tent:

The His­to­ry of Phi­los­o­phy … With­out Any Gaps

The Illus­trat­ed Guide to a Ph.D.

Down­load 90 Free Phi­los­o­phy Cours­es and Start Liv­ing the Exam­ined Life

Josh Jones is a writer and musi­cian based in Wash­ing­ton, DC. Fol­low him at @jdmagness

The Jean-Paul Sartre Cookbook: Philosopher Ponders Making Omelets in Long Lost Diary Entries

sartre food

In 1987, Mar­ty Smith pub­lished a spoof called The Jean-Paul Sartre Cook­book in a Port­land, Ore­gon alter­na­tive news­pa­per called the Free Agent. Lat­er, in 1993, it was repub­lished in the Utne Read­er. And it starts with this premise:

We have been lucky to dis­cov­er sev­er­al pre­vi­ous­ly lost diaries of French philoso­pher Jean-Paul Sartre stuck in between the cush­ions of our office sofa. These diaries reveal a young Sartre obsessed not with the void, but with food. Appar­ent­ly Sartre, before dis­cov­er­ing phi­los­o­phy, had hoped to write “a cook­book that will put to rest all notions of fla­vor for­ev­er.” The diaries are excerpt­ed here for your perusal.

Now for a cou­ple of my favorite entries:

Octo­ber 3

Spoke with Camus today about my cook­book. Though he has nev­er actu­al­ly eat­en, he gave me much encour­age­ment. I rushed home imme­di­ate­ly to begin work. How excit­ed I am! I have begun my for­mu­la for a Den­ver omelet.

October 6

I have real­ized that the tra­di­tion­al omelet form (eggs and cheese) is bour­geois. Today I tried mak­ing one out of a cig­a­rette, some cof­fee, and four tiny stones. I fed it to Mal­raux, who puked. I am encour­aged, but my jour­ney is still long.

November 23

Ran into some oppo­si­tion at the restau­rant. Some of the patrons com­plained that my break­fast spe­cial (a page out of Remem­brance of Things Past and a blow­torch with which to set it on fire) did not sat­is­fy their hunger. As if their hunger was of any con­se­quence! “But we’re starv­ing,” they say. So what? They’re going to die even­tu­al­ly any­way. They make me want to puke. I have quit the job. It is stu­pid for Jean-Paul Sartre to sling hash. I have enough mon­ey to con­tin­ue my work for a lit­tle while.

November 26

Today I made a Black For­est cake out of five pounds of cher­ries and a live beaver, chal­leng­ing the very def­i­n­i­tion of the word “cake.” I was very pleased. Mal­raux said he admired it great­ly, but could not stay for dessert. Still, I feel that this may be my most pro­found achieve­ment yet, and have resolved to enter it in the Bet­ty Crock­er Bake-Off.

The diary entries con­tin­ue here. And it just so hap­pens that The New York­er lat­er found Sartre’s long lost blog. You can read that online too.

Relat­ed Con­tent:

Jean-Paul Sartre Breaks Down the Bad Faith of Intel­lec­tu­als

Wal­ter Kaufmann’s Lec­tures on Niet­zsche, Kierkegaard and Sartre (1960)

Sartre, Hei­deg­ger, Niet­zsche: Three Philoso­phers in Three Hours

by | Permalink | Make a Comment ( 1 ) |

Walter Benjamin’s Philosophical Thought Presented by Two Experimental Films

Lit­er­ary the­o­rist and schol­ar Wal­ter Ben­jamin was part of a small but incred­i­bly sig­nif­i­cant cohort of Ger­man-Jew­ish intel­lec­tu­als who fled the Nazis in the thir­ties. The group includ­ed thinkers like Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Han­nah Arendt, Her­bert Mar­cuse, and Bertolt Brecht. Of all of the names above, only Ben­jamin suc­cumbed, com­mit­ting sui­cide by mor­phine over­dose in 1940 at a Cat­alon­ian hotel, when it became clear that the Span­ish, with whom he had sought refuge, were going to turn him back over to Ger­many.

Of all of the thinkers above, most of whom are fair­ly well-known by U.S. stu­dents of the lib­er­al arts, it can (and should) be argued that Ben­jamin was the most influ­en­tial, even if he rarely appears on a syl­labus, except­ing one well-known essay, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechan­i­cal Repro­ducibil­i­ty,” a sta­ple of film and media the­o­ry class­es. All of the thinkers list­ed above adored Ben­jamin, and all of them fig­u­ra­tive­ly sat at his feet. And while Benjamin—often by ref­er­ence to the afore­men­tioned essay—gets pegged as a Marx­ist thinker, he was also some­thing else; he was a mys­tic and a sage, the crit­i­cal equiv­a­lent, per­haps, of Kaf­ka.

The 1993 exper­i­men­tal film above—One Way Street: Frag­ments for Wal­ter Ben­jamin—is part doc­u­men­tary, part low-bud­get cable-access edit­ing exer­cise. The film pro­vides an intro­duc­tion to Benjamin’s life and thought through inter­views with schol­ars, re-enact­ments of Benjamin’s last days, and mon­tages cen­tered around his many apho­ris­tic expres­sions. One Way Street opens with an epi­gram from Benjamin’s pupil Brecht, from the latter’s poem “On the Sui­cide of the Refugee W.B.,” in which Brecht eulo­gizes his mentor’s prophet­ic strain: “the future lies in dark­ness and the forces of right / Are weak. All this was plain to you.” Indeed, it is this mys­ti­cal aspect of Ben­jamin that defies his strict cat­e­go­riza­tion as a dog­mat­ic Marx­ist mate­ri­al­ist. Through the con­sid­er­able influ­ence of his friend Ger­shom Scholem, Ben­jamin acquired a deep inter­est in Kab­bal­is­tic thought, includ­ing a mes­sian­ic streak that col­ored so much of his writ­ing.

In ref­er­ence to this Jew­ish mys­ti­cism, Anson Rabin­bach, edi­tor of New Ger­man Cri­tique sum­ma­rizes Benjamin’s thought above:

The world is… dis­persed in frag­ments, and in these frag­ments, the frag­ments of the world that God has now turned his back on, reside cer­tain pres­ences, which attest to the for­mer exis­tence of their divine char­ac­ter. You can­not active­ly go about to dis­cov­er these divine pres­ences, but they can be revealed.

Accord­ing to Rabin­bach, Benjamin’s method was, sim­i­lar to Freud’s, an attempt to “unlock” these “ema­na­tions” by “jux­ta­pos­ing things that don’t quite nec­es­sar­i­ly appear to be relat­ed to each oth­er… And this is the Kab­bal­is­tic sense, that you can­not go direct­ly at the task, because the dis­clo­sure of the ema­na­tion is blocked.” Benjamin’s frag­men­tary “method” pro­duced prodi­gious results—hundreds upon hun­dreds of pages of essays, and a frus­trat­ing­ly unfin­ished book pub­lished as The Arcades Project.

His thought is so diverse that one com­menter in the film above—Michael Jen­nings, author of Ben­jamin study Dialec­ti­cal Images—says that “the way that Ben­jamin is used most in this coun­try, is to dip in and take a quo­ta­tion out of con­text, in sup­port of any argu­ment one could think of, and I used to take umbrage at this, until I real­ized that this was pre­cise­ly Benjamin’s own prac­tice.” In this way, Ben­jamin occu­pies a sim­i­lar place in the human­i­ties as Russ­ian lit­er­ary the­o­rist Mikhail Bakhtin. Where he is famous, he is famous for cre­at­ing whole con­cep­tu­al fields one can invoke by utter­ing a sin­gle word or phrase.

One of the most potent words in the Ben­jamin lex­i­con is the French term flâneur. The flâneur is a “stroller, idler, walk­er,” a “well-dressed man, strolling leisure­ly through the Parisian arcades of the nine­teenth century—a shop­per with no inten­tion to buy, an intel­lec­tu­al par­a­site of the arcade” (as Ben­jamin web­site “The Arcades Project Project” defines it). The flâneur is an indi­vid­ual of priv­i­lege and a prog­en­i­tor of the male gaze: “Tra­di­tion­al­ly the traits that mark the flâneur are wealth, edu­ca­tion, and idle­ness. He strolls to pass the time that his wealth affords him, treat­ing the peo­ple who pass and the objects he sees as texts for his own plea­sure.” The flâneur is not sim­ply a pas­sive observ­er; he is instead a kind of lazy urban preda­tor, and also a dandy and pro­to-hip­ster. Per­haps the most sin­is­ter rep­re­sen­ta­tion of this char­ac­ter (in a dif­fer­ent urban con­text) is the creepy Svidri­gailov in Dostoevsky’s Crime and Pun­ish­ment.

In the 1998 film above, Flâneur III: Benjamin’s Shad­ow, Dan­ish direc­tor Tor­ben Skjodt Jensen and writer Urf Peter Hall­berg col­lab­o­rate on an impres­sion­is­tic black-and-white med­i­ta­tion on Paris, over­laid with Hallberg’s rumi­na­tions and quo­ta­tions from Ben­jamin. Benjamin’s fas­ci­na­tion with nine­teenth-cen­tu­ry Paris drove his mas­sive, unfin­ished Arcades Project, an exca­va­tion of the inner work­ings of moder­ni­ty. Where One Way Street is marked by a very dat­ed 90’s aes­thet­ic (which may look chic now that the decade’s back in fash­ion), the above film is both clas­si­cal and mod­ernist, a tes­ta­ment to the beau­ties and con­tra­dic­tions of Paris. I think in this respect, it is a more fit­ting trib­ute to the crit­i­cal and con­tra­dic­to­ry aes­thet­ic the­o­ry of Wal­ter Ben­jamin.

Relat­ed Con­tent:

Hear Theodor Adorno’s Avant-Garde Musi­cal Com­po­si­tions

Han­nah Arendt Dis­cuss­es Phi­los­o­phy, Pol­i­tics & Eich­mann in Rare 1964 TV Inter­view

Mar­tin Hei­deg­ger Talks About Lan­guage, Being, Marx & Reli­gion in Vin­tage 1960s Inter­views

Josh Jones is a writer and musi­cian based in Wash­ing­ton, DC. Fol­low him at @jdmagness

The Atheism Tapes Presents Lengthy Interviews with Arthur Miller, Daniel Dennett & Richard Dawkins About Religion and Unbelief

The his­to­ry of religion(s) is a fas­ci­nat­ing sub­ject, one that should be cov­ered, in my hum­ble opin­ion, as an inte­gral part of every lib­er­al arts edu­ca­tion. But the his­to­ry of atheism—of disbelief—is a sub­ject that only emerges piece­meal, in oppo­si­tion­al con­texts, espe­cial­ly in the wake of recent fun­da­men­tal­ist upris­ings in the past decade or so. We cov­ered one such his­to­ry recent­ly, the 2004 BBC series Athe­ism: A Rough His­to­ry of Dis­be­lief, made by direc­tor Jonathan Miller and fea­tur­ing such high-pro­file thinkers as Richard Dawkins, Daniel Den­nett, Arthur Miller, and physi­cist Steven Wein­berg.

Miller’s series orig­i­nal­ly includ­ed much more mate­r­i­al than he could air, and so the BBC agreed to let him pro­duce the out­take inter­views as a sep­a­rate pro­gram called The Athe­ism Tapes. It’s a series in six parts, fea­tur­ing inter­views with Eng­lish philoso­pher Col­in McGinn, Wein­berg, Miller, Dawkins, Den­nett, and British the­olo­gian Denys Turn­er. At the top, watch Miller’s intro to The Athe­ism Tapes and his inter­view with Col­in McGinn. It’s an inter­est­ing angle—Miller gets to quiz McGinn on “what it means to be a skep­ti­cal Eng­lish philoso­pher in such a seem­ing­ly reli­gious coun­try as the Unit­ed States.” Many read­ers may sym­pa­thize with McGinn’s dif­fi­cul­ty in com­mu­ni­cat­ing his unbe­lief to those who find the con­cept total­ly alien.

Direct­ly above, watch Daniel Den­nett (after the intro) dis­cuss the rela­tion­ship between athe­ism and Darwin’s rev­o­lu­tion­ary the­o­ry. Miller is a won­der­ful interviewer—sympathetic, prob­ing, informed, humor­ous, human­ist. He is the per­fect per­son to bring all these fig­ures togeth­er and get their var­i­ous takes on mod­ern unbe­lief, because despite his own pro­fes­sions, Miller real­ly cares about these big meta­phys­i­cal ques­tions, and his pas­sion and curios­i­ty are shared by all of his inter­vie­wees. In the intro­duc­tion to his inter­view with play­wright Arthur Miller (below), Jonathan Miller makes the provoca­tive claim that Chris­tian­i­ty believes “there’s some­thing pecu­liar about the Jews that makes them pecu­liar­ly sus­cep­ti­ble to pro­fane dis­be­lief.” Watch Arthur Miller’s response below.

One would hope that all man­ner of people—believers, athe­ists, and the non-committal—would come away from The Athe­ism Tapes with at least a healthy respect for the integri­ty of philo­soph­i­cal and sci­en­tif­ic inquiry and doubt. See the full series on YouTube here. Or pur­chase your copy on Ama­zon here.

Relat­ed Con­tent:

Athe­ism: A Rough His­to­ry of Dis­be­lief, with Jonathan Miller

Richard Dawkins Makes the Case for Evo­lu­tion in the 1987 Doc­u­men­tary, The Blind Watch­mak­er

Philoso­pher Daniel Den­nett Presents Sev­en Tools For Crit­i­cal Think­ing

Josh Jones is a writer and musi­cian based in Wash­ing­ton, DC. Fol­low him at @jdmagness

The Way Too Philosophical Pop Song

Sec­ond City has giv­en us many great improv com­e­dy sketch­es and come­di­ans over the decades … and now com­ic videos on YouTube too. From this video col­lec­tion comes the “Too Philo­soph­i­cal Pop Song,” whose open­ing lines resem­ble the hack­neyed lyrics of so many con­tem­po­rary pop tunes.

We’ve got to be young while we live, and live while we are young.
We’ve got to live for tonight because tomor­row won’t come.

We’ve all heard these exis­ten­tial clichés before, right? But then, the “Too Philo­soph­i­cal Pop Song” gets, well, too philo­soph­i­cal, swerv­ing dark­ly of course.

We have to par­ty like we’ll nev­er see tomor­row, there­by destroy­ing the intrin­sic val­ue of this moment and our­selves.
The cer­tain­ty of death inval­i­dates our actions tonight.
We’re thrown into this uni­verse with no pur­pose, com­pelled to fab­ri­cate mean­ing.
There is no good, there is no right, and our morals are craft­ed out of rea­son.

Makes it a lit­tle hard to get your groove on … unless you’re a UVA grad stu­dent or one of those heady guys at Par­tial­lyEx­am­inedLife. Don’t miss their pod­cast.

via Leit­er Reports

Relat­ed Con­tent:

Free Phi­los­o­phy Cours­es from Great Uni­ver­si­ties

Rap­ping About Sci­ence: Watch High School Senior Jabari John­son Talk Physics with Poet­ic Lyrics

A Song of Our Warm­ing Plan­et: Cel­list Turns 130 Years of Cli­mate Change Data into Music

by | Permalink | Make a Comment ( 1 ) |

The Feud Continues: Noam Chomsky Responds to Žižek, Describes Remarks as ‘Sheer Fantasy’

chomsky-zizek-feud-continues

Noam Chom­sky has issued a state­ment in reac­tion to our July 17 post, “Slavoj Žižek Responds to Noam Chom­sky: ‘I Don’t Know a Guy Who Was So Often Empir­i­cal­ly Wrong.’ In an arti­cle post­ed yes­ter­day on ZNet titled “Fan­tasies,”  Chom­sky says Žižek’s crit­i­cism of him is com­plete­ly unground­ed. “Žižek finds noth­ing, lit­er­al­ly noth­ing, that is empir­i­cal­ly wrong,” writes Chom­sky. “That’s hard­ly a sur­prise.”

The rift between the two high-pro­file intel­lec­tu­als began, as you may recall, when Chom­sky crit­i­cized Žižek and oth­er con­ti­nen­tal philoso­phers for essen­tial­ly talk­ing non­sense — for cloak­ing triv­i­al­i­ties in fan­cy lan­guage and using the sci­en­tif­ic-sound­ing term “the­o­ry” to describe propo­si­tions that could nev­er be test­ed empir­i­cal­ly. Žižek lashed back, say­ing of Chom­sky, “I don’t think I know a guy who was so often empir­i­cal­ly wrong.” He went on to crit­i­cize Chom­sky’s con­tro­ver­sial ear­ly posi­tion on Amer­i­can assess­ments of the Khmer Rouge atroc­i­ties in Cam­bo­dia. (To read Žižek’s com­ments, click here to open the ear­li­er post in a new win­dow.) In response yes­ter­day, Chom­sky said he had received numer­ous requests to com­ment on our post:

I had read it, with some inter­est, hop­ing to learn some­thing from it, and giv­en the title, to find some errors that should be cor­rect­ed — of course they exist in vir­tu­al­ly any­thing that reach­es print, even tech­ni­cal schol­ar­ly mono­graphs, as one can see by read­ing reviews in pro­fes­sion­al jour­nals. And when I find them or am informed about them I cor­rect them.

But not here. Žižek finds noth­ing, lit­er­al­ly noth­ing, that is empir­i­cal­ly wrong. That’s hard­ly a sur­prise. Any­one who claims to find empir­i­cal errors, and is min­i­mal­ly seri­ous, will at the very least pro­vide a few par­ti­cles of evi­dence — some quotes, ref­er­ences, at least some­thing. But there is noth­ing here — which, I’m afraid, does­n’t sur­prise me either. I’ve come across instances of Žižek’s con­cept of empir­i­cal fact and rea­soned argu­ment.

Chom­sky goes on to recount an instance when he says Žižek mis­at­trib­uted a “racist com­ment on Oba­ma” to Chom­sky, only to explain it away lat­er and say that he had dis­cussed the issue with Chom­sky on the tele­phone. “Of course,” writes Chom­sky, “sheer fan­ta­sy.” Chom­sky then moves on to Žižek’s com­ments report­ed by Open Cul­ture, which he says are typ­i­cal of Žižek’s meth­ods. “Accord­ing to him,” writes Chom­sky, “I claim that ‘we don’t need any cri­tique of ide­ol­o­gy’ — that is, we don’t need what I’ve devot­ed enor­mous efforts to for many years. His evi­dence? He heard that from some peo­ple who talked to me. Sheer fan­ta­sy again, but anoth­er indi­ca­tion of his con­cept of empir­i­cal fact and ratio­nal dis­cus­sion.”

Chom­sky devotes the rest of his arti­cle to defend­ing his work with Edward Her­man on the Khmer Rouge atroc­i­ties. He claims that no fac­tu­al errors have been found in their work on the sub­ject, and he draws atten­tion to a pas­sage in their book After the Cat­a­clysm, quot­ed last week by Open Cul­ture read­er Poyâ Pâkzâd, in which they write, “our pri­ma­ry con­cern here is not to estab­lish the facts with regard to post­war Indochi­na, but rather to inves­ti­gate their refrac­tion through the prism of West­ern ide­ol­o­gy, a very dif­fer­ent task.”

You can read Chom­sky’s com­plete rebut­tal to Žižek here.

Relat­ed Con­tent:

Noam Chom­sky Slams Žižek and Lacan: Emp­ty ‘Pos­tur­ing’

Slavoj Žižek Responds to Noam Chom­sky: ‘I Don’t Know a Guy Who Was So Often Empir­i­cal­ly Wrong’

Clash of the Titans: Noam Chom­sky & Michel Fou­cault Debate Human Nature & Pow­er on Dutch TV, 1971

 

Watch Out For the Flying Folding Chairs, It’s The Noam Chomsky Show!

The word “philoso­pher” tends to con­jure up the arche­typ­al image of an ascetic fig­ure stand­ing above the fol­lies of every­day life, absorbed in thought. Per­haps that’s why so many peo­ple have found it fas­ci­nat­ing to hear of the dis­agree­ments between Noam Chom­sky and Slavoj Žižek.

Sev­er­al weeks ago we post­ed an excerpt from an inter­view in which Chom­sky accus­es Žižek, along with Jacques Lacan and Jacques Der­ri­da, of emp­ty “pos­tur­ing.” Yes­ter­day we post­ed Žižek’s response to Chom­sky: “I don’t think I know a guy who was so often empir­i­cal­ly wrong.” Some of the respons­es have been amus­ing. “The gloves are off!” wrote one read­er on Twit­ter. “Fight! Fight! Fight!” said anoth­er.

Of course, we should bear in mind that the two celebri­ty intel­lec­tu­als are not real­ly at each oth­er’s throats. Chom­sky gave his brief assess­ment of Žižek and the oth­ers in response to a ques­tion dur­ing a long inter­view back in Decem­ber. Žižek’s remarks were a small part of a two-hour pan­el dis­cus­sion on var­i­ous top­ics. It’s hard to imag­ine either man seething over what the oth­er has said.

Still, the bois­ter­ous­ness of many of the respons­es remind­ed us of the stu­dio audi­ence in this 2009 sketch (above) from The Chaser’s War on Every­thing, an Aus­tralian com­e­dy show. The sketch is a par­o­dy of The Jer­ry Springer Show and the oth­er tabloid TV talk shows that mul­ti­plied like weeds in the 1990s. It’s extreme­ly sil­ly, but good for a laugh.

Relat­ed Con­tent:

Noam Chom­sky Slams Žižek and Lacan: Emp­ty ‘Pos­tur­ing’

Slavoj Žižek Responds to Noam Chom­sky: ‘I Don’t Know a Guy Who Was So Often Empir­i­cal­ly Wrong’

Noam Chom­sky Calls Post­mod­ern Cri­tiques of Sci­ence Over-Inflat­ed “Poly­syl­lab­ic Tru­isms”

Clash of the Titans: Noam Chom­sky & Michel Fou­cault Debate Human Nature & Pow­er on Dutch TV, 1971

 

« Go BackMore in this category... »
Quantcast